

PPE CONFERENCE 2023



FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON PPE

11-12 MAY 2023

University of Groningen, The Netherlands

KEYNOTES

Anca Gheaus, CEU Vienna

Serene Khader, CUNY New York

Ingrid Robeyns, University of Utrecht

Sara Stevano, SOAS University of London



university of
 groningen

centre for ppe

Overview

With this conference, we want to offer an opportunity for members of the “Philosophy, Politics, and Economics” community (broadly conceived) to come together in Europe and discuss recent papers and work in progress. We invite papers in the field of “PPE” from historical, methodological, and normative perspectives. Depending on the number of submissions, these will be discussed in plenary or parallel sessions. Maximally a third of the slots will be reserved for papers on this year's keynote theme, whereas the other slots will be open for general PPE papers.

Keynote theme

“PPE” is becoming more and more a discipline of its own. But the three disciplines it is composed of, philosophy, politics, and economics, have historically all been heavily dominated by male voices from "the West." At the same time, there have long been “feminist” critiques in all contributing fields. And it seems indeed that many PPE themes - e.g. issues of economic justice, the nature of capitalism, or questions about the methodology of “rational economic man” (sic) - require a feminist lens. But how exactly can and should feminist perspectives be integrated into the research and teaching of PPE? Which feminism(s) to draw on? And how to take the insights of intersectionality - roughly, that gender intersects with other lines of privilege and disadvantage - into account? And asked the other way around: are there specific insights that PPE can bring to feminism? Can PPE open new avenues for feminism across the disciplinary boundaries of the three sub-disciplines?

Organizing committee

Constanze Binder (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)

Programme Committee

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Felix Pinkert (University of Vienna)
Johanna Thoma (London School of Economics)

Thursday, May 11

- 12.30-13.00 **Welcome and round of introductions** (Tammeszaal)
 13.00-14.00 **Keynote I** (Tammeszaal)
 Ingrid Robeyns (Utrecht University):
 Feminist Analyses of Limitarianism
 14.00-14.30 Coffee Break (Tammeszaal)
 14.45-15.45 **Panel Session I** (20 min presentation + 10 min discussion)

Tammeszaal	Beta (Phil.)	Alpha (Phil.)
Camila Orozco Espinel (University of Reims) and Rebeca Gomez Betancourt (University of Lyon): A History of the Institutionalization of Feminist Economics through Its Tensions and Founders	Friedemann Bieber (University of Zurich): Temporal Autonomy and the Distinctive Burden of Care Work	Rebecca Clark (University of Oxford): Working-From-Home and the Gendered Division of Labour
Magdalena Malecka (Aarhus University): Whose values, which values? Feminist economists as economic methodologists	Sofia Rebrey (MGIMO-University): Why don't we use time-use? (online)	Antoine Louette (HU Berlin): Fetishism, Commodity, and Sexuality

- 15.45-16.00 Coffee Break (Tammeszaal and Faculty of Philosophy)
 16.00-17.00 **Panel Session II** (20 min presentation + 10 min discussion)

Tammeszaal	Beta (Phil.)	Alpha (Phil.)
Tatiana Llaguno Nieves (University of Groningen): Turning the Tables: Society's Dependence on Reproductive Labor	Manon Garcia (FU Berlin): Is the submissive woman rational?	Sonia Hoque (University College London): Is unpaid work a burden? Decolonising discourses around women's reproductive roles
Arndt Mehrkens and Patricia Duarte de Almeida	Frank Hindriks (University of Groningen): Structural Injustice and	Natacha Bastiat-Jarosz, Alena Sander, Florence Degavre

(Hanze University Groningen): The Purpose Economy concept as a variant of Feminist Economics	Social Change: A Feminist Perspective	(University of Louvain): Girlbosses or change-makers? Identities, Positioning and Activism of Feminist Business Owners in Berlin
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- 17.15-18.15 **Keynote II** (Omega (Phil.))
Sara Stevano (SOAS University of London):
Social Reproduction: Reclaiming a Feminist Understanding of Capitalism
- 18.15-19.45 Drinks (Faculty of Philosophy)
- 20.00 Dinner (Cafe Tjall, Oude Boteringestraat 43)

Friday, May 12

- 09.00-10.00 **Keynote III** (Tammeszaal)
Anca Gheaus (CEU Vienna):
Feminist political philosophy: How to run the debates within public reason
- 10.00-10.15 Coffee break
- 10.15-11.15 **Panel Session III**
(20 min presentation + 10 min discussion)

Tammeszaal	Gamma (Phil.)	Omega (Phil.)
Robert Hanson (University of Groningen): Just Acquisition but Unjust Retention: An Argument for Using Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy in Economic Theory	Georg Schmerzeck (University of Gothenburg): Dworkin's monetary system	Matt Bennett (University of Essex): Winner-takes-all social competition
Victoria Browne (Oxford Brookes University): Who counts as a 'political philosopher'? Strategic anachronism and transdisciplinarity as pedagogical techniques	Valerie Schreur (University of Amsterdam): What justice requires from institutions that govern business credit allocation	Elias Moser (University of Graz): Reflections on the fair distribution of risk in the gig economy

- 11.15-11.30 Coffee Break
- 11.30-12.30 **Panel Session IV** (20 min presentation + 10 min discussion)

Tammeszaal	Gamma (Phil.)	Omega (Phil.)
Begum Icelliler (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill): Republicanism, Labor Organizing, and Economic Non-Domination	Barbara Bziuk (Utrecht University): Power and corporate political responsibility for structural injustice: taking Young seriously in business ethics.	Akshath Jitendranath (Free University of Amsterdam): Optimization and Beyond
Jacob Barrett (University of Oxford): Philanthropy for the Disenfranchised	Elena Bernal Rey (FU Berlin): Who can claim that my preferences are adaptive?	Mans Abrahamson (Erasmus University Rotterdam): Truer preferences: Interaction effects and nth-best considerations in behavioural paternalism

12.30-13.30 Lunch Break (near Omega (Phil.))

13.30-14.30 **Panel Session V** (20 min presentation + 10 min discussion)

Tammeszaal	Gamma (Phil.)	Omega (Phil.)
Bele Wollesen (LSE): When are we equal? On the power of strategic voting	Roland Luttens (Free University of Amsterdam): Harmonic price (in)justice	Armin Mašala (University of Zurich): Improving Legitimacy. Razian Authority, Schools for the Deaf and Improvement
Eva Schmidft (University of Münster): Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Mini Publics	Colin von Negenborgn (University of Hamburg): The game of life. On the combination of pathocentric environmental ethics and game theory	Sanat Sogani (CEU Vienna): Adequate Opportunity to Receive Fitting Appraisal Respect

14.30-14.45 Coffee Break (Faculty of Philosophy)

14.45-15.45 **Keynote IV** (Omega (Phil.))

Serene Khader (CUNY New York): Freedom Trouble: Why We Fall for White Feminism, Neoliberal Feminism, and Other Feminisms for the Few

15.45-16.00 **Closing Remarks**

Practical information


Room for opening session:

Tammeszaal, Library Building, Broerstraat 4, 4th floor

Other rooms:

Various rooms in the Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52 (enter the building through the little alley on the right-hand side of the building, then take the glass door on the left). Omega and Gamma are on the ground floor; Alpha and Beta are on the first floor.

Emergency numbers: Lisa: +31 6 29 69 80 07; Constanze: +31 6 48 61 43 81.



Abstracts

(in alphabetical order, according to the family name of the author)

Mans Abrahamson (Erasmus University Rotterdam): Truer preferences: Interaction effects and nth-best considerations in behavioural paternalism

Behavioural paternalism, such as nudging, seeks to steer people in the direction of choices that make them better off, as judged by themselves, through engaging with people's biases and reasoning limitations. These policy interventions are justified by an appeal to people's true preferences—the preferences people would form were they to pay full attention, possess full information, reason rationally, and so forth. From a theoretical perspective, the operationalisation of this normative standard is straightforward: construct a choice-context where all the conditions of true preferences are satisfied and use the preferences over options revealed in this context as guide when designing policy-interventions. This is not how behavioural paternalism operates in practice, however. Rather than eliciting and guiding policy based on preferences satisfying all conditions of true preferences, behavioural paternalism tends to (i) target one particular bias or reasoning limitation in isolation, in (ii) narrow choice-domains. That is, behavioural paternalism is merely approximating true preferences—eliciting and guiding policy based on 'truer' preferences. In this presentation, I challenge this approximating approach based on considerations due to the general theory of second-best. By drawing on a broader empirical literature in psychology and behavioural economics, I highlight important interaction effects between biases and between choices: people's choices in given domains are often subject to a multitude of interacting biases, there are important interdependencies between choice-domains, and people's choices are subject to path-dependencies. In light of these findings of additional 'distortions' in people's choices, I argue for revised behavioural policy-design depending on the characteristics of given policy-contexts: whether the context is a first-best world (without additional distortions), second-best world (with reliable information about additional distortions), or third-best world (without reliable information about additional distortions).

Jacob Barrett (University of Oxford): Philanthropy for the Disenfranchised

Most discussions of philanthropy focus on the ethics of charitable giving: how much should you give, and where? But philanthropy is also a topic for political philosophy or theory: what role should philanthropy play in a democratic society? In this paper, I begin with the latter question, and argue that while there is a serious tension between philanthropy and democratic principles of political equality, certain forms of philanthropy are nevertheless democratically complementary or even enhancing. Specifically, just as markets underproduce public goods, democracies underproduce goods that benefit those without influence on the political process, so—on any plausible theory of democracy—philanthropy can play a morally important role benefiting disenfranchised groups. I then tie my discussion back to the individual ethics of philanthropy, and explore some social and political implications. Ethically, democratic values suggest a focus on benefiting disenfranchised groups, and a reluctance to engage in most other forms of philanthropy. This yields a considerable convergence with the ethics of effective altruism at the abstract level of "cause areas," but a significant divergence from effective altruism about the relative desirability of concrete

interventions. Politically, we should reform the institutions governing philanthropy to make them better serve disenfranchised groups. Here, I focus not only on tax policies and other formal institutions, but also on the social norms governing the esteem we pay philanthropists and how much deference we give them.

Natacha Bastiat-Jarosz, Alena Sander, Florence Degavre (University of Louvain): Girlbosses or change-makers? Identities, Positioning and Activism of feminist business owners in Berlin

Feminist businesses (FB), that is bottom-up economic enterprises whose objectives and strategies are defined according to feminist values and social principles, have been on the rise for a while in Europe and North America. The few literatures concerned with FB focuses on their critical assessment, drawing attention to an apparent dilemma of these businesses: run by and employing feminists, they rely on neoliberal market mechanisms that are often viewed as individualistic, exploitative, and depoliticized, and thus, un-feminist. Coming from a weak theory and diverse-economies framework (Gibson-Graham, 2008), this contribution argues that the literature's assessments rely on the assumption that "everything is neoliberal capitalism" to which feminism should, naturally, be an antagonist. Thereby the literature does not just neglect the various forms of feminismS, intersectional identities, and economic practices that have evolved especially in the light of fourth-wave feminism. It also reproaches them for being co-opted by neoliberalism, before they are even explored in their complexity. Consequently, the proposed article's aim is to explore how FBs position themselves with regard to the economy, what forms of feminismS they adhere to, and in what particular social practices these translate in everyday feminist business. Thus, the contribution moves beyond the traditional frontier between for-profit and not-for-profit, and, instead, explores the economy as a site of economic diversity and feminist action. Following thick description and feminist methodological approaches of qualitative method-triangulation, the article draws from exploratory field work with owners and stakeholders of FB in Berlin in 2022.

Matt Bennett (University of Essex): Winner-takes-all social competition

Modern market economies use competitive institutions to distribute a range of social goods. Some theorists have cited winner-takes-all distribution as an unacceptable variant of such competition. At the most general level, winner-takes-all competitions are those with a very high ratio of competitors to opportunities for success, and with a very large difference between the outcomes for the highest performing competitors and everyone else. But the particulars of winner-takes-all theories differ across disciplines, and the concept has been used in both diverging and overlapping ways across philosophy, political science, and economics. Moreover, few winner-takes-all theorists explain why we should not tolerate these outcomes despite the purported benefits of social competition. The goals of this paper are twofold. The first is to collect together treatment of winner-takes-all across different disciplines philosophy, economics, and political science, and clarify the characteristic features of winner-takes-all competition. The second is to provide a novel argument against winner-takes-all social competition that appeals to the standards that proponents of social competition are already committed to. I invoke two such standards – efficiency and meritocracy – and argue that because winner-takes-all competition faces distinctive obstacles to meeting both

standards, even proponents of social competition should prefer an alternative rewards structure.

Elena Bernal Rey (FU Berlin): Who can claim that my preferences are adaptive?

The term “Adaptive Preferences” refers to psychological entities that establish an order among the options of a person, an order that is affected by the limited number of options, in such a way that the person devalues the options that are out of the possible set. It has been used by philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum to explain why people in situations of oppression, for example “third world women”, seem to be at ease in their situations, since it shows how preferences can be incompatible with wellbeing. This realization has been in turn used to justify the motivation for political interventions aiming to improve wellbeing. However, those justifications have been contested by de-colonial theorists such as Serene Khader because they can deny the autonomy of oppressed people. My worry goes further: talking about the nature of the preferences of oppressed people might deny their epistemic authority because it can bring testimonial injustice and other forms of epistemic violence. That’s why we should ask: “Who can say if a preference is adaptive?” My claim is that one can only say if a preference is adaptive in the first person (singular or plural). I defend this idea because a lot of the literature on adaptive preferences talks about the preferences of oppressed people from places of privilege without them participating in their diagnosis. I develop an account of how to talk about adaptive preferences in the first person which aims to change the way the concept is used, taking away its power to justify political intervention and rather turns it into a tool for oppressed people to reach their own liberation.

Friedemann Bieber (University of Zurich): Temporal Autonomy and the Distinctive Burden of Care Work

The concern with time for oneself and one’s projects has traditionally centred on paid labour. From the 19th century onwards, it has been common for progressives to rally against long hours toiled by workers at the command of capitalists yet to disregard all efforts expended on unpaid care work. While the feminist critique of this framing dates far back, the view that unpaid work deserves equal concern and esteem has become a mainstream position only recently. However, it is now generally accepted in the literature. Julie Rose (2019), for instance, defines *free time* as “time beyond what is objectively necessary for one to spend to meet one’s (or one’s depend- ents’) basic needs”; and Robert Goodin and co-authors (2008) define *discretionary time* as the hours that remain after spending the minimal amount of time necessary to earn an income, take care of one’s social chores (including care work), and to satisfy personal needs like sleeping. While clearly a step forward, this paper argues that these accounts lack the resources to fully appreciate the burden of unpaid care work and fail to fully capture our concern with time for oneself. In caring for one’s children or one’s elderly parents, the burden partly lies in the un- predictability and irregularity of this work. We cannot determine, and may be unable to predict, when our assistance will be needed – a dependent person may fall ill at any time. This under- mines our capacity to make plans and renders it more difficult to take on other commitments, thereby weakening our agency. It is thus not only the number of hours of work, but also their regularity, predictability, and our control over them, that affects the form and value of time for

oneself. Pursuing this argument, the paper puts forward an alternative account of *temporal autonomy*, which recognises the dual limitation on the fungibility of time: not only are we frequently unable to trade time for money; we also cannot accumulate or store it, which is why the timing of free time, and our control over it, matters.

Victoria Browne (Oxford Brookes University): Who counts as a ‘political philosopher’? Strategic anachronism and transdisciplinarity as pedagogical techniques

This paper will approach the conference theme ‘Feminist Perspectives on PPE’ from a pedagogical standpoint, critically reflecting on the process of reworking the ‘history of political philosophy’ curriculum within a UK university. First, it will argue that we need to reconsider the temporal structure as well as the content of our curricula, making a case for strategic anachronism as a pedagogical technique. Second, it will argue for an embrace of transdisciplinarity as a concept and technique that can help us broaden our understanding of what ‘political philosophy’ is and who counts as a ‘political philosopher’. It will thus address particularly the question of ‘how exactly can and should feminist perspectives be integrated into the research and teaching of PPE?’.

Barbara Bziuk (Utrecht University): Power and corporate political responsibility for structural injustice: taking Young seriously in business ethics

From human trafficking, exploitation and poverty to obesity and other food-related health conditions, business corporations have been linked to and deemed responsible for many global problems based on Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility. Using this model, business ethicists argue in favor of ascribing extensive and positive obligations to business corporations, such as lobbying the government to remedy injustice, engaging with others to create public institutions, or working towards certain political reforms. In this paper, I argue that such responsibility attribution is not sufficiently sensitive to power – a crucial element in Young’s theory. I propose a reading of Young’s account of responsibility (2011) that integrates her earlier work on justice (1990) and based on this, and on my critique of the existing literature on corporate political responsibility for structural injustice, I introduce a power-sensitive account of corporate political responsibilities. I maintain that adding relational power to this literature modifies the diagnosis of structural injustice in a twofold way: it allows for differentiating between agents contributing to structural injustice and problematizes the very social positions these agents occupy. Accordingly, business corporations are identified as agents that contribute to structural injustice more substantially than other actors and that occupy a privileged social position relative to others. From this diagnosis of structural injustice, it follows that acting on political responsibility by privileged actors should be subject to two conditions ensuring that the risk of reproducing injustice is minimized: it should involve a collective and a self-reflective element, or so I argue. Using a real-life example of Facebook acting on its political responsibility, I conclude by discussing practical implications of my critique and the proposed alternative.

Rebecca Clark (University of Oxford): Working-From-Home and the Gendered Division of Labour

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, working-from-home (WFH) has rapidly become commonplace for white-collar workers across rich industrialised economies. Since working-from-home improves the labour market participation of people with caring responsibilities, many claim that the ability to work-from-home is especially beneficial for *women*.

Against this view, social scientists have warned that working-from-home typically harms a person's own career prospects relative to their in-person colleagues; since women are predicted to work-from-home more than men in the future, women will disproportionately suffer these career penalties. However, this objection is relatively weak since individuals can rightly be held responsible for the outcomes of their choices so long as they are reasonably well-informed and have adequate outside options.

A much stronger feminist objection to greater opportunities to work-from-home focuses on the aggregate effect of individuals' choices on *other individuals* and *social structures*. Firstly, women's choices to work-from-home will likely have negative spill-over effects on other women. Secondly, the ability to work-from-home is likely to increase the amount of unpaid reproductive labour carried out by women and to ease the pressures associated with the double burden, thereby perpetuating gender-unjust social structures (namely, the dual-breadwinner model).

Feminists must trade off these two deleterious aggregative effects against the fact that more opportunities to work-from-home benefit caregivers through better employment prospects. This feminist dilemma is structurally analogous to feminist debates around a universal basic income, part-time work, and parental leave. In response, I propose a policy package that combines gender egalitarian interventions into WFH with greater state provision of childcare. This package would retain the benefits of WFH whilst reducing the negative spill-over effects of WFH and challenging gender roles.

Manon Garcia (FU Berlin): Is the submissive woman rational?

Many people seem to share the intuition that gender egalitarian views are now predominant in society and that gender inequality is slowly but surely disappearing. Yet, through the ideas of maternal instinct, female masochism, or through the representation of heterosexual love, and the discourse on female desire, it is common to attribute, directly or indirectly, to women the responsibility of their submission, understood as any attitude of non-resistance to male domination, because this submission is seen as the result of a skewed moral disposition. In the background of this idea, one can discern the millennial hypothesis of female irrationality: it is because women are irrational that they do not value freedom adequately and choose submission; they are, therefore, blameworthy for their submission. In this paper, I argue that female submission is not the result of a moral disposition but rather a rational choice, shaped by the structural oppression of women in patriarchal societies. To do this, I use the economic literature on rational choice theory and allocations of power and resources within the household to show that female submissiveness is both a rational choice and the result of oppression. By showing that submission is a rational choice in a situation of autonomy limited by oppression, I intend to demonstrate that female submission is not a moral problem but a political problem.

Anca Gheaus (CEU Vienna): Feminist political philosophy: How to run the debates within public reason

“Woman” has become an essentially contested concept: some people believe it is, or should be used as, a sex term, others that it is, or should be used as, a gender term. Proponents of the latter view, according to whom to be a woman means to have a certain gender identity, disagree as to how exactly we should understand “gender identity”. These cleavages are undergirded by metaphysical and ethical disagreements, and therefore may be here to stay. They jeopardise the feminist project – defined as it has always been by reference to “woman” – and, more generally, the ability of feminists and non-feminists alike to discuss practical matters concerning the ways in which certain exclusionary spaces should be organised. I suggest how we can re-think the feminist project without “woman”: as a coalition against certain kinds of gender norms, which I call *sui-generis*. I also suggest how both feminists and non-feminists can engage in the substantive normative debates that need solutions, without talking about “women”. Instead, we should refer to the particular biological facts (such as hormones, chromosomes, gametes or sexual organs) and/or gender facts (such as gender roles, gender socialisation, internalised gender norms), which are already assumed, by the parties to the debate, to have normative significance. Following this suggestion would yield a complicated and messy normative picture, and would not in itself resolve normative disagreements, but would at least stand the chance to better articulate them and, thus, make progress possible.

Robert Hanson (University of Groningen): Just Acquisition but Unjust Retention: An Argument for Using Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy in Economic Theory

Wealth and Windfall Taxes have generated great attention in recent years as a potential means for addressing the continued growth in wealth inequality. As a concept, they remain controversial given that they make private property rights subject to social causes. In this paper, I argue that the controversy over these taxes results from an untenably individualistic understanding of the individual as an economic agent whilst also conflating the justness of wealth acquisition with the justness of wealth retention (Nozick). In response to this, I argue for a more Relational understanding of the individual as presented in the Feminist writings of Annette Baier and Sophia Dandeleit; perspectives that recognises the role others play in the individual’s wealth creation, acquisition, and retention, and cast the individual as a social entity. This will allow me to justify the use of Wealth and Windfall taxes as consistent with valuing individual autonomy and propose a framework that recognises the normative significance of just acquisition whilst appreciating the *reductio* of permitting wealth retention that undermines individual autonomy. To make this case, I will focus on the topics of Historical Injustices, Intergenerational Wealth, and Economic Reparations. These are cases where the contemporary individual’s wealth cannot be understood without reference to their relationship to others, including the state which acts as an indirect guarantor for the individual’s inheritance. Parallels will be drawn with other cases of wealth creation to highlight the role of interpersonal relations in wealth creation generally, as well as why the justness of wealth acquisition does not determine the justness of wealth retention.

Frank Hindriks (University of Groningen): Structural Injustice and Social Change: A Feminist Perspective

Social change requires awareness of a structural problem and of a desirable alternative. Here I combine insights from feminist philosophy with tools from economics and political science to explain what this means and why awareness is not enough. I propose that social structures consist of social rules that give meaning to the actions people perform, along with the equilibria or behavioral regularities they give rise to. Those rules and regularities constrain, create or otherwise enable certain actions or outcomes. There are three kinds of (pure) cases. First, a regularity enables some people and constrains others. Second, rules or regularities form constraints on actions that enable people to achieve outcomes. Third, (signaling) rules create and thereby enable new actions. In these ways, social structures affect the distribution of power, often marginalizing certain social groups in the process. Crucially, the prevailing rules can limit the extent to which people are aware of the injustices they suffer from. Such a lack of awareness constitutes an epistemic or hermeneutic injustice. Ameliorative analysis can help resolve it as well as enable people to envision desirable alternatives. However, making such an alternative work requires more than awareness, as achieving it constitutes a collective action problem. The alternative must form an equilibrium. Furthermore, the rules that constitute this equilibrium have to be supported by people who are suitably connected to each other. In particular, to overcome the conflict of interests between them, they need to activate others and provide each other assurance.

Sonia Hoque (University College London): Is unpaid work a burden? Decolonising discourses around women's reproductive roles

This paper critically examines feminist epistemology at the nexus of Feminist Economics (FE) and Gender and Development (GAD). The paper is based on preliminary PhD research; I will conduct empirical research on how Bangladeshi women perceive their reproductive role (called unpaid work by FE) and how we can 'know' this is a burdensome, disempowering role - as implied in GAD and FE discourse. As a British-Bangladeshi young scholar, who was raised by women who take great pride and joy in their traditional reproductive role, and often express they find paid work less fulfilling, I found current GAD discourse uncomfortable. Paid work is labelled as 'empowering' by GAD practitioners, motivated undoubtedly by academic 'evidence' that it is so, and unpaid work has increasingly been presented as 'disempowering'. In the context of Bangladesh where exploitative, low-paid, and potentially dangerous jobs are promoted for women (e.g. garment factory work), I will analyse power dynamics around knowledge generated in the Global North about Southern women's reproductive roles. In the words of Mohanty, (1988), I see a tendency to 'Other' women who undertake reproductive work for their families as being submissive/oppressed by gender norms - which are being cited as being a possible explanation for stagnating women's labour force participation in Bangladesh. Motivated by a surprising rise of Bangladeshis saying 'being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay' in the 2020 World Values Survey, and my own lived experience, I will use interpretive methods to explore lived realities of reproductive work, and impacts on well-being. My paper will present findings from a critical review of theoretical feminist literature on social reproduction and argue Global North feminists must be reflexive and mindful of how they 'represent' subaltern women's complex roles. I will also critique current reductive methods to 'value'

reproductive work (time-use data, calculating GDP values - analysis dominated by positivist economists) and argue for methodological pluralism - particularly the use of decolonial methods - to study this role.

**Begum Icelliler (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill):
Republicanism, Labor Organizing, and Economic Non-Domination**

The republican revival has brought the problem of economic domination to the attention of political theorists. The responses to this problem vary. Market-sympathetic neo-republicans like Phillip Pettit conceptualize domination in interpersonal terms, thus advocating for the individual ability to exit dominating relationships. Market-skeptic radical republicans like Alex Gourevitch conceptualize domination in structural terms, thus pushing for the importance of voice to transform relations of domination. I argue that for economic non-domination, exclusionary institutions like labor unions, non-union labor organizations, and social movements that promote the sectional interests of the politically disenfranchised are necessary. Neo-republicans have sidestepped these types of workers' organizations in favor of national-level legislation. The problem with the neo-republican account is that the legal regulations and social protections that it advocates can only be secured through labor organizing as a component of national politics. Legislation that guarantees the meaningful opportunity to exit dominating relationships is a necessary condition for non-domination, but, as I argue in this paper, labor organizing is the primary mechanism through which it can be achieved. Radical republicans are warmer to institutions that empower workers, but labor organizations have largely been missing from their accounts. The paper contributes to their side of the debate by theorizing the mechanism of radical social change, thus providing an answer to the perennial question of how we can get from here to there. I demonstrate the importance of labor organizing for republican thinking by outlining four functions of labor organizations. These functions are epistemic, deliberative, pedagogical, and ontological.

Akshath Jitendranath (Free University of Amsterdam): Optimization and Beyond

Are you facing a hard choice when, in a given choice situation, you cannot optimize or go for the best? I shall be concerned with addressing this question here. More specifically, I defend the following pair of claims: (i) the class of situations where an optimal or best alternative does not exist because of incompleteness of the binary preference or value relation constitutes a hard choice; whereas (ii) the class of situations where one cannot optimize because one holds a cyclic relation do not constitute a hard choice.

My defence of this pair of claims will proceed in three steps. First, I argue that the basic problem that needs to be addressed when you cannot optimize is not that a choice set—or action guiding proposal, as I shall call it here—is undefined. Rather, the problem that needs to be addressed is whether or not such choice sets or action guiding proposals are *justified*. The second step is the heart of the paper and it defends the main claims being advanced here. Specifically, this step of the argument starts by presenting two ways in which we can scrutinize distinct action guiding proposals, to wit: *case-implication scrutiny* and *prior principle scrutiny*. Then, on these grounds, it is argued that an action guiding proposal to deal with the problem of decision making with a cyclic relation is justified, while the most prominent proposal to deal with

decision making with an incomplete relation is not justified. Third, and finally, I consider and respond to a pair of the strongest objections that I anticipate being presented against the claims being defended here. A final section concludes.

Serene Khader (CUNY New York): Freedom Trouble: Why We Fall for White Feminism, Neoliberal Feminism, and Other Feminisms for the Few

Feminism is at a crossroads. It is more popular than ever. This means both that many elite women seem ready to pull the ladder up behind them, and that we are finally having a robust public conversation about the frequency with which feminist movements have excluded, or even harmed, women of color and poor and working class women.

Feminists tend to talk about these problems primarily as products of the privilege of the women whose voices dominate the movement. I argue that they also stem from a single idea: the idea that feminism is a movement to free individual women from social expectations. Once we recognize how freedom unites a surprising number of bad and faux feminisms—from femonationalism to neoliberal feminism to white feminism—we can start to imagine feminism differently. This is not a process we have to start from scratch; feminism for the many conceives feminism as a movement against inequality and is alive in a number of intersectional feminist movements today.

Tatiana Llaguno Nieves (University of Groningen): Turning the Tables: Society's Dependence on Reproductive Labor

In this paper, I bring together feminist views on work and social reproduction to suggest a revision and reorientation of the feminist discourse on dependence. Rather than portraying women as dependent on men (Delphy 2016) and as in need of securing independence above everything else, I propose emphasizing society's dependence on reproductive labor (Laslett and Brenner 1989; Federici 2004; Mies 2014; Fraser 2014, 2016). It is true that, with the transition to capitalism, workers became individually and collectively dependent on capital, and women—in varying degrees—became individually and collectively dependent on capital and on men. However, my claim is that the language of independence ends up being limiting for the purpose of women's emancipation. In the first part, the paper discusses how the language of independence participates in a liberal form of subjectivity, itself traversed by the denial of dependencies (Brown 1995). It also shows how the repudiation of social reproduction enables the construction of the unencumbered subject of civil society, that many feminist theorists have problematized. In the second part, I delve into the issue of reproductive labor. By shifting the view of women as dependent to society as dependent, I direct our concerns to the necessary maintenance of relations of dependence, while putting forward a critique of the terms and conditions under which that maintenance currently takes place. I take this reversal to be productive in analytical and political terms: if women's oppression is linked to their condition of dependence, then independence is the answer; if women's oppression is explained through the disavowal of life-reproducing activities, then a rearticulation of our dependencies appears as the most pertinent response.

Antoine Louette (HU Berlin): Fetishism, Commodity, and Sexuality

In the field of PPE (Philosophy, Politics, Economics), some recent insight in the analysis of commodity fetishism as market ideology promises to offer a clear basis of resistance to the ideological reproduction of class domination. This paper argues that this insight can usefully be adapted to sexuality fetishism and the ideological reproduction of gender domination.

On the prevalent understanding of commodity fetishism, the failure of workers and capitalists to realise that they themselves participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work is due to the fact that nothing in the social milieu they frequent alerts them to their participation in this process of social construction (Elster 1986, Torrance 1995, Cohen 2000). Taking inspiration from this approach, feminist theorists have offered a similar analysis of men and women's failure to realise that they themselves participate in the (hetero)sexualisation of women (e.g., McKinnon 1983, Lahire 2001).

But both views face a similar problem. For while workers' ability to work is indeed commodified in the market, this account of commodity fetishism fails to explain why this ability should also be commodified at home or among neighbours (Sewell 1992; see also Celikates 2016, Haslanger 2017), and so why discrepancies between social milieu do not allow workers and capitalists to notice that they participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work (Louette 2022). Likewise, I argue in this paper, women are indeed sexualised in various public settings, from Miss pageants to clubs to the streets themselves, but it is unclear why they should also be sexualised with their parents, siblings, or friends, among other milieu, and so why men and women fail to realise that they are largely responsible for the (hetero)sexualisation of women. To rescue the analysis of commodity fetishism, it has recently been argued that more attention should be paid to the profit-maximising logic of market competition which, by encouraging workers and capitalists to commodify hitherto uncommodified milieu, deprives them of the discrepancies between milieu that would help them notice that they themselves participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work (Louette 2022). Taking inspiration from this argument, I go on to suggest that if men and women fetishize (hetero)sexuality, it is because gender domination organises its own form of competition, among women and for men's attention (hooks 1984; see also Ferrarese 2021), which by encouraging women's (hetero)sexualisation in more and more milieu deprives women and men of the discrepancies that would have them pay attention to their continuous participation in the social construction of (hetero)sexuality.

Roland Luttens (Free University of Amsterdam): Harmonic price (in)justice

Suppose Anne is in the possession of a little marble bust of Aristotle, which she is willing to sell for 50e or more. Bob, an enthusiastic student of philosophy, is willing to pay her 100e or less. What would be the just price for the statuette in this situation?

Arguably the most salient solution is to equate the just price to 75e, which is the arithmetic mean of Anne's minimum willingness to sell and Bob's maximum willingness to pay. The normative appeal of this just price is that the exchange partners receive an equal absolute amount of money, namely 25e, over/under their two esteem values, respectively. Another, maybe less straightforward, solution would be to calculate the geometric mean, i.e. multiply first the minimum willingness to sell and maximum willingness to pay and then take the square root of the result. In our example, the just price would equal 70.71e in that case.

Roger Backhouse, in his *The Penguin History of Economics*, argues that Aristotle's formulation and analysis of the elements of price formation found in Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* equates the just price neither to the arithmetic mean, nor to the geometric mean, but, instead, to the third Pythagorean mean, called the harmonic mean (Backhouse (2002), p.21). For the special case of just two numbers, the harmonic mean is related to the arithmetic and geometric mean. It is obtained by first squaring the geometric mean and then dividing the result by the arithmetic mean. In our example, the just price would hence equal 66.67e. Remarkably, the normative appeal of using the harmonic mean is elegantly clear. That is because the harmonic mean has the property that the percentage gain for both buyer (below the maximum willingness to pay) and seller (above the minimum willingness to accept) is equalized. Indeed, in our example, exchanging the statuette for a price of 66.67e would imply that Bob receives a 33.34% discount over the 100e he was willing to pay to Anne. Likewise, Anne receives a 33.34% extra gain over the 50e she was willing to accept from Bob.

The motivation for our analysis is the observation that, despite its normative appeal, the harmonic mean has been largely neglected as a solution concept in allocation problems. In this paper, we investigate the relevancy of the harmonic mean for normative economic theory. We first formulate a formal framework to define just price problems and just price solutions and discuss some desirable properties for just prices. Then, we identify for a just price problem its corresponding bargaining game. We ask which axiomatic bargaining solution corresponds to the harmonic mean as a solution of the just price problem. We identify the harmonic mean solution of a two-person bargaining problem as the weighted Nash bargaining solution with weights equal to the relative esteem values of the agents. Finally, we move from bilateral exchange (via bargaining) to market exchange. We advocate for the use of harmonic prices in a new evaluative criterion of price injustice, using monetized welfare derived from market exchange in the Neoclassical demand-supply framework.

Magdalena Malecka (Aarhus University): Whose values, which values? Feminist economists as economic methodologists

In the talk I would like to follow-up on my previous work on values in economics (anonymized). I argued that feminist economists' analyses, which trace value presuppositions in economic research, should be regarded as an important contribution to economic methodology. I intend to elaborate on this point by providing a metanalysis of the strategies that feminist economists use to trace value presuppositions about gender in background assumptions, operationalizations of concepts, interpretations of evidence produced in economics. My goal is to understand how - in the light of which evidence, arguments, reasoning etc. - feminist scholars identify gendered values in economic research. Do they encounter in their analyses other value presuppositions, for instance, those about race? If yes, how do they distinguish between various value preconceptions? Do considerations of intersectionality enter their analysis and are they analytically tractable in tracing values? My case study will be rational choice theory, widely commented by feminist scholars (for review see: Rolin 2012) and highly influential not only in economics, but also in modern philosophy, including political philosophy and ethics. Neoclassical economics, and rational choice theory, have been criticized by many commentators. Apart from numerous flaws in explanatory and predictive power of the neoclassical approach, critics often point out as problematic

values embedded in its framework: ‘sexist’, ‘racist’, or ‘capitalist’. Yet, how do we identify these values? Can we know for sure *which values exactly* have entered rational choice theory? Despite enormous interest in the topic of values in science in general philosophy of science, there is no systematic effort to reflect on and come up with methods of how exactly to identify which values enter research. Too often philosophers of science rely on their pre-existing intuitions or informed guesses when making claims about the types of values which may have entered science. I believe that feminist scholars offer us some guidance on how to approach this task in a systematic and reflective way and I will attempt to show it on the basis of the feminist analyses of rational choice theory.

Armin Mašala (University of Zurich): Improving Legitimacy. Razian Authority, Schools for the Deaf and Improvement

Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority has been subject to a lot of debate in political philosophy (Raz 1983; 1985; 1986; 2006). I add to this debate by arguing that Raz’s service conception is insufficient to explain a particular case of illegitimate authority, which is exemplified by a case study of the history of Western European deaf education. I propose that we ought to add a further condition to the service conception to account for this insufficiency, the improvement condition. It states that authority is legitimate only if it makes efforts to improve its legitimacy. After the improvement condition is developed, I use it to answer Scott Hershovitz’s Proceduralist Objection: Hershovitz (2003; 2011) argues that a purely substantive theory of authority, like the service conception, is insufficient because authorities can generally be illegitimate on proceduralist grounds. With a procedural interpretation of the improvement condition, I conclude that it does not fall prey to Hershovitz’s objection. Lastly, I sketch the implication of the improvement condition to normative democratic theory.

Arndt Mehrrens and Patricia Duarte de Almeida (Hanze University Groningen): The Purpose Economy concept as a variant of Feminist Economics

The Purpose Economy as originally proposed by Aaron Hurst (2014, 2016) and further developed by Kees Klomp and Shinta Oosterwaal (2021) may be considered as the materialization of attempts to achieve the most comprehensive kind of human and non-human thriving. It incorporates everything from sustainability economics, circular economics and well-being economics to as specific and recent a discipline as degrowth economics. In our paper, a case is being made for the proposition that all of the above may be/should be subsumed under the concept of Feminist Economics, and from this field of research and activism a light is shone on what Hurst takes to be the defining features of the Purpose Economy: real value, personal growth and community. Employing Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance” (Philosophical Investigations, §§65-71), an attempt will be made to avoid the quandaries of conventional approaches to defining Feminist Economics. Contributions will be considered to how Purpose Economy inspired Applied Economics in all types of universities may/should benefit from both didactic overhaul and curricular contents review. To that end, concepts and initiatives from Catherine Trebeck, Kate Raworth, Diana Strassman (economics related), Roberta Hall and Julie Nelson (didactics related) are incorporated. Furthermore, based on exploratory action research conducted at Hanze University Groningen, a combination of feminist inspired didactics and contents overhaul is

presented as a “soft power” alternative to neoclassical economics and management study programs, which too many students may have been “drip-fed” throughout their (applied) university studies, both to their personal detriment and that of societies.

Elias Moser (University of Graz): Reflections on the fair distribution of risk in the gig economy

Over the past decade, the development and implementation of algorithmically managed platforms has fundamentally changed the world of work in certain sectors. Traditional employment relationships turned into contract relationships. Workers have become self-employed contractors, while platforms act only as middlemen between clients and workers, abdicating their role and responsibilities as employers. As Friedemann Bieber and Jakob Moggia (2021) impressively pointed out, this development amounts to a shift in risks to the disadvantage of workers, which involves a problem of justice that is a major challenge to the regulation of labor markets. In an unregulated gig economy, entrepreneurial risk is unilaterally imposed on workers as the costs of social security, absence from work, vacation, as well as fluctuations in workload have to be borne by the workers themselves.

In this article, I examine Bieber and Moggia’s argument in favor of a duty held by firms to insure gig workers against these risks. I will show, on the one hand, that the risk shift does not necessarily amount to an injustice that justifies such a duty. On the other hand, I will show on which conditions an unfair risk shift depends. I will argue that risk is unfairly allocated among firms and workers only if there is an asymmetry in the endowment with relation specific capital. Against this background, the question then arises as to how this asymmetry can be compensated for or avoided altogether.

Colin von Negenborn (University of Hamburg): The game of life. On the combination of pathocentric environmental ethics and game theory

How do our actions affect other people? Many ethical theories require us to at least consider this question in our decision-making. However, the consequences of our actions are not always easily identifiable, particularly when these actions are both input to and outcome of interdependent choices of individuals. Hence, game theory has been employed to analyse the “right” course of action in complex systems. (c.f. Gauthier, Binmore, Skyrms). The language of games describes the interaction of agents (*players*) within a given setting (*game*), where the players’ choices (*moves*) have consequences (*payoffs*) according to the rules of the game. Its formal methodology allows to disentangle this interaction and to identify presumably desirable equilibria.

However, the application of game theory to ethics has so far been inherently anthropocentric: it is only *humans* who are considered as relevant agents with own payoff functions. Animals are either of instrumental use only (as in the game of “stag hunt”) or completely absent. Environmental ethics requires us to question this omission. It argues that sentience, rather than species membership, is the relevant criterion to be considered by other agents in their decision-making. Hence, the consequences of our actions at least on higher animals must not be ignored. Utilitarian theories of environmental ethics such as Peter Singer’s pathocentrism are well compatible with the methodology of game theory, allowing for a combination of the two.

The present contribution describes both the possibility and the necessity of such combination: linking game theory and environmental ethics. It argues that differences

between humans and animals pose no conceptual difficulty. We can distinguish between moral *agents* and mere *patients*, we can account for different levels of rationality, foresight and recall (c.f. Stahl & Wilson 1995). Since animals do react to human interference and adapt the behavior, a mere *decision*-theoretic approach is insufficient and a *game*-theoretic approach is warranted. A combination of environmental ethics and game theory allows us to figure out how to “play fair” with nature.

Camila Orozco Espinel (University of Reims) and Rebeca Gomez Betancourt (University of Lyon): A History of the Institutionalization of Feminist Economics through Its Tensions and Founders

Feminist economics was produced by the deployment of relatively diverse research under a single academic label. This article offers a global picture of the first years of feminist economics. Focusing on the heterogeneity of the approaches that coexist in the field—and the porosity among them—this article proposes an answer to the question, How does feminist economics persist as an approach and a community even though both are quite diverse? The three tensions studied were as follows: the tension between the Women's Caucus of the Union for Radical Political Economics and the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession, along with the role played by the sessions organized during the ASSA conferences; the tension between the different methodologies used by feminist economists; and the tension surrounding the place of feminist economics in the discipline. We identified different elements to understand how feminist economists coexist under the same umbrella. Feminist economists' common frustration about economics' resistance to including feminist perspectives is central. The main sources for this paper are seventeen semistructured interviews we conducted in 2019 and 2020 aiming to collect the oral histories of selected feminist economists closely related to the beginning of the institutionalization process of the field.

Sofia Rebrey (MGIMO-University): Why don't we use time-use? (online)

The key factor and indicator of gender inequality is the gender gap in time spent on unpaid labor (domestic chores and childcare). As a result of the 4th World Conference on Women (Pekin, 1995) the UN collects time use data (however shares only the results) in most countries. National statistic agencies also conduct time use surveys and sometimes share data and metadata. It presents a great source of information for economists to widen the horizon of analysis primarily focused on the income distribution. Many feminist economists suggested time as a great indicator of capabilities (A.Sen) and a household production (M. Reid). Gender gap in time use is highly correlated with global ratings of gender inequality, but not used by any of them. Neither it is used by policymakers.

New methods of big data analysis bring new insights to the time use survey study by showing what factors have the most impact on the gender gap in time-use allocation. Moreover, time-use survey is a great indicator of the quality of life. The analysis investigates how to decrease the gender gap in time spent on unpaid labor by looking at what determines the time use. Russia's case shows that gender time use gap depends on economic factors for men and on cultural for women even during shocks like COVID-19. Men's involvement in domestic labor barely unburden women. It also shows that different factors impact men's participation in childcare and in domestic chores.

Ingrid Robeyns (Utrecht University): Feminist analyses of limitarianism

Economic limitarianism is the view that it is impermissible to be excessively rich. So far, a gender analysis is missing from this literature. How would a feminist analysis of limitarianism look like? Answering this question requires not just to engage with the various arguments that have been advanced in favour and against limitarianism, but also to be clear about what we mean by 'a feminist analysis'. To answer the question what we understand under 'a feminist analysis' of the design of a social institution, I engage with scholarship that addressing this question at a methodological level, as well as analyzing the implicit understanding of what 'a feminist analysis' entails in feminist analyses of unconditional basic income. This then allows me to answer the question whether, from a feminist point of view, limitarianism is to be rejected or endorsed, and what qualifications to that judgement are needed.

Georg Schmerzeck (University of Gothenburg): Dworkin's monetary system

Monetary systems are elementary political institutions but have rarely been studied by contemporary political philosophers. Ronald Dworkin's influential political theory, equality of resources, is a case in point: Despite many of its policy proposals relying eminently on the use of money, neither Dworkin nor the secondary literature have ever dealt with the question how money should be issued and retired.

The target of this paper is to identify the monetary system that a society striving to realize equality of resources should adopt. To do so, I engage with two of the theory's levels of ideality: The first is the ideal ideal world, the purpose of which is to develop an abstract ideal of resource allocation under the unrealistic assumptions of general equilibrium theory. Dworkin argues that, to show each other equal concern under these assumptions, parties distribute resources using a Walrasian auction, but doesn't specify how they exchange resources after the initial auction. Falling back on uncontroversial results of general equilibrium theory, I demonstrate that resource exchange is accomplished using barter, without money.

The purpose of the ideal real world is to develop institutions which, when generally adhered to by ordinary people, give rise to resource allocations resembling those of the ideal ideal world. Consecutively relaxing abstractions of the ideal ideal world, I argue that its exchange patterns are best approximated under a monetary system characterized by demurrage and a prohibition on the private issuance of money and debt. This conclusion is defended by showing alternative institutions to approximate ideal ideal resource exchange less well.

Eva Schmidt (University of Münster): Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Mini Publics

Deliberative mini publics (DMPs) are all the rage in recent years. They promise to answer what civil society's opinions would be, had all facts and points of view been readily available. DMP's are supposed to provide this solution by fostering high quality deliberation and thereby engaging citizenry in a meaningful way. Crucial to this promise is the selection mode (random sampling), which allows people to come together in a structured setting that promises everyone the chance to be heard who otherwise simply would not. However, as much as this political innovation has to offer, critics claim that, even though DMPs manage to avoid external exclusion (marginalized individuals are

rarely present at decision-making tables), a more insidious kind of exclusion remains: internal exclusion. Internal exclusion are the ways in which some people – typically members of marginalized and disempowered groups – speak and are heard and believed less in face-to-face deliberation. I argue that the concept of internal exclusion can best be made productive by looking to feminist theories, specifically theories of epistemic injustice, which is concerned with wrongs of a specifically epistemic kind. I will treat epistemic injustice as the theoretical conceptualization of the empirical concept of internal exclusion. Using epistemic injustice to make internal exclusion more fruitful conceptually allows us to identify the aspects and organizational choices in DMPs that need to be made in order to mitigate internal exclusion. Examples are group composition, decision-making rule, agenda setting and choice of experts, speech norms and the weighted random sampling.

Valerie Schreur (University of Amsterdam): What justice requires from institutions that govern business credit allocation

One of the primary functions of banks is to fund businesses. The standard justification in economic theory for the current market-based system for allocating credit to businesses is based on a supposed higher productivity of a market-based allocation. Through market mechanisms, banks are incentivized to grant loan applications based on businesses' profit outlooks, weighed against market and credit risk. In the financial ethics literature, business credit is understood primarily in its economic function of enhancing productivity. The condition of productivity is either both necessary and sufficient for justifying bank loans to businesses, or necessary but not sufficient, without specifying what, then, would be sufficient for justifying bank loans to businesses. In this paper, I challenge the productivity justification. Instead I argue in favor of a consequentialist approach beyond welfarist economic assumptions, for the allocative credit arrangement to be just. I present two closely related reasons for this: first, money is a semipublic good whose governance should, ideally, include some kind expectations towards realizing socio-democratic goals, as argued by a growing literature in philosophy of money. When money is brought into circulation for funding the needs not of an individual, but of a business actor, what that business substantially contributes to social needs is pertinent. Second, the choice whether or not to fund business activities through loans greatly affect the social world and human wellbeing. Think about the choice between funding another coal mine or not. By bringing together the practice of business debt and philosophy of finance, this paper addresses a gap in financial ethics literature on debt relations between banks and businesses, as this literature thus far is focused almost exclusively on individual citizens or households. Further, the paper adds to a growing literature in political philosophy on the democratization of finance.

Sanat Sogani (CEU Vienna): Adequate Opportunity to Receive Fitting Appraisal Respect

I argue that the division of labour in a society should be such that people have an adequate opportunity to receive fitting appraisal respect. Using a framework proposed by Stephen Darwall (1977), I distinguish between two kinds of respect – recognition respect and appraisal respect. Giving recognition respect to a person amounts to giving due consideration to their moral agency. Appraisal respect constitutes respect for excellence as a person or as engaged in some specific pursuit. I argue that, like

recognition respect, appraisal respect is also a consideration of justice, one that is particularly relevant to debates about workplace justice. To sustain our self-esteem, it is crucial that we are respected for our worth as human beings (recognition respect) as well as appreciated for our particular actions and capacities (appraisal respect).

Current working time arrangements severely limit individuals's ability to get appraisal respect outside of their jobs. Moreover, some jobs do not give enough opportunities for the individual to act in appraisal respect worthy ways at work. Thus, I argue that as a matter of justice, either working times should be adjusted and/or jobs should be restructured wherever necessary to give individuals adequate opportunities to act in appraisal respect worthy ways. This has direct implications for debates about gendered division of labour. Many forms of care work performed by women give the workers inadequate opportunity to receive appraisal respect, reinforcing existing status hierarchies.

Sara Stevano (SOAS University of London): Social Reproduction: Reclaiming a Feminist Understanding of Capitalism

The renewed interest in social reproduction, spurred by the work of social reproduction theorists, offers a great potential: to foreground feminist thinking in the understanding of capitalism. Economics and political economy have long suffered from a pernicious shortcoming: the failure to incorporate social reproduction as a fundamental dimension of the functioning of socio-economic systems. Even where there have been some gains in the legitimacy of gender analysis, the concern with gender is most often considered as a side issue. Social reproduction offers a shift in perspective in that it takes as a starting point all the work and material practices needed to reproduce life and capitalist relations, it then examines how these articulate with the organization of capitalist production. As such, it offers a unifying framework to capture the intersection or co-constitution of gender, class and race oppression in capitalism that takes us further than documenting the existence of gender inequality, to analysing the nature of co-constituted oppression and exploitation. In addition, it opens up a space for interdisciplinary engagement across the social sciences, thus taking forward the feminist agenda of crossing the boundaries of disciplines and methods. It allows to connect scales and locations in the global economy through the consideration of both micro everyday practices and the intergenerational macro-structural processes that sustain economies and societies. Finally, the focus on human life lends itself to being extended to non-human life, offering the possibility to develop a research agenda that is concerned with the social and ecological conditions of reproduction within capitalism, thus speaking directly to the major crises humanity is facing.

Bele Wollesen (LSE) When are we equal? On the power of strategic voting

This paper aims to show how formal voting theory and political philosophy can benefit from taking insights from each other seriously in the case of strategic voting. In the first part of the paper, I show that the same arguments that relational equalitarians use to deduce the principle ‘one person, one vote’ also commit to designing voting rules that prevent strategic voting. Very roughly, it is normatively relevant for democratic legitimacy that we have all the same voting power over each other qua the voting rule. Hence, under this construal, the potential harm of strategic voting lies in the *power differences* between voters that those with better strategic skills can induce. I will then show how strategic voting can upset the power balances supposedly ensured by ‘one person one vote’. Thus, relational egalitarians ought to be more demanding of the formal requirements of voting procedures as they currently are. In the second part of the paper, I analyze desiderata that formulate second-best solutions to prevent all possibilities of strategic voting within Social Choice. This literature standardly seeks to reduce the number of strategic votes. For instance, one approach is to make strategic voting computationally harder. While this may reduce the number of successful strategic votes, it needs to be clarified which normative concern this is tracking. Reducing strategic votes by making voting computationally harder will, for instance, not necessarily reduce power imbalances between voters but may even increase them.